Blockchain for the Internet of Things: a Systematic Literature Review by Conoscenti, Marco et al.
Politecnico di Torino
Porto Institutional Repository
[Proceeding] Blockchain for the Internet of Things: a Systematic Literature
Review
Original Citation:
Conoscenti, Marco; Vetrò, Antonio; De Martin, Juan Carlos (2016). Blockchain for the Internet
of Things: a Systematic Literature Review. In: 2016 IEEE/ACS 13th International Conference of
Computer Systems and Applications (AICCSA), Agadir (MAR), Nov. 29 2016-Dec. 2 2016. pp. 1-6
Availability:
This version is available at : http://porto.polito.it/2650266/ since: September 2016
Publisher:
IEEE
Published version:
DOI:10.1109/AICCSA.2016.7945805
Terms of use:
This article is made available under terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Article
("Public - All rights reserved") , as described at http://porto.polito.it/terms_and_conditions.
html
Porto, the institutional repository of the Politecnico di Torino, is provided by the University Library
and the IT-Services. The aim is to enable open access to all the world. Please share with us how
this access benefits you. Your story matters.
(Article begins on next page)
Blockchain for the Internet of Things: a Systematic
Literature Review
Marco Conoscenti
Nexa Center for Internet & Society
DAUIN-Politecnico di Torino
ITALY
Email: marco.conoscenti@polito.it
Antonio Vetro`
Nexa Center for Internet & Society
DAUIN-Politecnico di Torino
ITALY
Email: antonio.vetro@polito.it
Juan Carlos De Martin
Nexa Center for Internet & Society
DAUIN-Politecnico di Torino
ITALY
Email: demartin@polito.it
Abstract—In the Internet of Things (IoT) scenario, the block-
chain and, in general, Peer-to-Peer approaches could play an
important role in the development of decentralized and data-
intensive applications running on billion of devices, preserving the
privacy of the users. Our research goal is to understand whether
the blockchain and Peer-to-Peer approaches can be employed to
foster a decentralized and private-by-design IoT. As a first step
in our research process, we conducted a Systematic Literature
Review on the blockchain to gather knowledge on the current
uses of this technology and to document its current degree of
integrity, anonymity and adaptability. We found 18 use cases of
blockchain in the literature. Four of these use cases are explicitly
designed for IoT. We also found some use cases that are designed
for a private-by-design data management. We also found several
issues in the integrity, anonymity and adaptability. Regarding
anonymity, we found that in the blockchain only pseudonymity is
guaranteed. Regarding adaptability and integrity, we discovered
that the integrity of the blockchain largely depends on the high
difficulty of the Proof-of-Work and on the large number of honest
miners, but at the same time a difficult Proof-of-Work limits the
adaptability. We documented and categorized the current uses of
the blockchain, and provided a few recommendations for future
work to address the above-mentioned issues.
I. INTRODUCTION
As defined by ITU [1], the Internet of Things (IoT) refers
to the network of numerous physical objects (20 billion by
2020, according to Gartner [2]) which are provided with
Internet connection. Such devices acquire information about
the surrounding environment, and they communicate with each
other and with software systems through the Internet. As a
consequence of such rich interaction, they also produce a large
amount of data, in turn usable to enable dependent services.
Despite the benefits provided by these services, critical
privacy issues may arise. That is because the connected
devices (the things) spread sensitive personal data and reveal
behaviors and preferences of their owners. People’s privacy
is particularly at risk when such sensitive data are managed
by centralized companies, which can make an illegitimate use
of them: as a matter of fact, Edward Snowden’s revelations
showed that people’s data stored by Internet and telecom-
munication companies have been exploited within a mass
surveillance program, i.e, the PRISM program [3].
With the purpose of preventing this situation, the goal
of our research is to encourage a decentralized and private-
by-design IoT, where privacy is guaranteed by the technical
design of the systems. We believe that this can be achieved
by adopting Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems. In particular, the
blockchain could be very helpful in building such privacy-
preserving IoT. The blockchain is a P2P ledger, firstly used
in the Bitcoin cryptocurrency [4] for economic transactions.
It is tamper-proof and contains only authentic information; in
addition, since it is P2P, it is not controlled by any single
centralized entity. For these reasons, cryptocurrencies are just
one of the possible applications of this technology.
A private-by-design IoT could be fostered by the combina-
tion of the blockchain and a P2P storage system. Sensitive data
produced and exchanged among IoT devices are stored in such
storage system, whose P2P nature could ensure privacy, robust-
ness and absence of single points of failure. Combined with
this storage system, the blockchain has the fundamental role
to register and authenticate all operations performed on IoT
devices data. Each operation on data (creation, modification,
deletion) is registered in the blockchain: this could ensure that
any abuse on data can be detected. Moreover, access policies
can be specified and enforced by the blockchain, preventing
unauthorized operations on data. In this framework, people are
not required to entrust IoT data produced by their devices to
centralized companies: data could be safely stored in different
peers, and the blockchain could guarantee their authenticity
and prevent unauthorized access.
In the paper we performed a Systematic Literature Review
(SLR) to verify whether documented use cases in the state
of the art confirm this possibility, and, on the other side, to
investigate which are the main factors that affect the levels of
integrity, anonymity and adaptability of the blockchain.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In
Section II first we briefly delineate the main features of the
blockchain, and then we describe goal and research questions
of the SLR and the research process. In Section III we
report the results obtained from the literature survey and in
Section IV we discuss them. Finally, in Section V we provide
conclusions and future work.
II. STUDY DESIGN
A. Context
The blockchain is a P2P ledger for transactions. To issue
transactions, public key cryptography is employed. A user is
TABLE I: Use Cases of the Blockchain beyond Cryptocurrencies (RQ1 and RQ2)
Category Paper Usage of the blockchain IoT
Data storage management
[5] Management of access policies and references to users’ data
[6] Management of data storage contracts
[7] Management of document storage contracts
[8] Tamper-proof log of events and management of access control to data X
[9] Management of metadata of data kept in a storage system
[10] Automatic compensation of clients of a storage server in case stored data are lost
[11] Immutable log where storing metadata of messages of decentralized applications
Trade of goods and data [12] Purchase by devices or human beings of assets such as sensors data or goods X
[13] Purchase of sensors data in IoT X
Identity management [14] Management of identity verification and certificate revocation of PGP certificates
[15], [16] Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Management of update, registration and revocation of keys X
Rating system [17] Tracking of users and contents points in a social voting system
[18] Rating system where customers can give feedbacks about a purchase
Other
[19] Management of software license validation
[20] Timestamping service, in order to prove a content has been produced before a specific date
[21] Implementation of a lottery
[22] Banking applications such as automated and distributed bank ledgers
[23] Implementation of a social cryptocurrency, to quantify social influence
provided with a public and a secret key: the secret key is
used for signing transactions, while the public one is used as
address in the system. So, no real-world identity is needed for
transactions: this is a form of pseudonymity. A transaction can
have multiple inputs and outputs. For instance, in economic
transactions - i.e. transactions representing transfers of coins
- the inputs are the addresses where coins come from and the
outputs are the addresses of the recipients of the coins. Each
input must be signed with the secret key corresponding to the
address it represents.
Transactions are relayed in the P2P network and some peers,
called miners, collect them together into a data structure, called
block. Once a new block is assembled, it is relayed in the P2P
network and, if valid, is chained to the current last block of
the blockchain. Each block contains a reference to the previous
block (that’s why it is called blockchain). After some time a
block is stored the blockchain, the transactions of the block
are considered confirmed.
A block is valid if it contains valid transactions and if miners
have performed a computationally-hard puzzle, which consists
in finding an hash of the block lower than a predefined target.
The miner which adds the next block to the blockchain is the
first which has assembled a valid block and has found a valid
solution to the puzzle. This specific mining technique is called
Proof-of-Work (PoW). The PoW allows to achieve distributed
consensus, which means that all nodes agree on the same
version of the blockchain and this blockchain contains valid
transactions. Forks could happen in this chain of blocks, that is,
there could be two contrasting branches of the chain. However,
thanks to PoW, eventually one of the branches should be
discarded and all nodes should agree on the same blockchain.
In case of forks, the rule is that miners extend the longest
branch or the one that has the most difficult PoW. Moreover,
thanks to PoW, the blockchain is hard to be tampered.
B. Goal and Research Questions
The goal of our research is to understand whether the
blockchain and, in general, P2P approaches can foster a
private-by-design IoT, where IoT devices data are not entrusted
to centralized companies, instead are property of the devices
owner, who can decide which data share and with whom. As
a first step of this research, we conducted a SLR to collect
use cases of the blockchain and to collect evidence from
the literature about the level of adaptability, integrity and
anonymity of the blockchain.
To achieve the goal of our SLR, we formulated the following
research questions (RQ):
RQ1) What are the use cases of the blockchain beyond
cryptocurrencies?
RQ2) Are there any use cases applicable to the IoT?
RQ3) What are the implementation differences with
respect to the Bitcoin blockchain?
RQ3.1) Which data are stored in the blockchain?
RQ3.2) Which mining techniques are used?
What is the degree of integrity (RQ4), anonymity (RQ5)
and adaptability (RQ6) of the blockchain?
RQ1 and RQ2 aim at discovering in the literature the uses of
the blockchain beyond Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies and which
of them are applicable to the IoT (according to the authors of
the papers).
By means of RQ3 we want to know the implementation
choices described in found papers which differs from the ones
of the Bitcoin blockchain: in fact, some of them could prove
to be useful when applying the blockchain in the IoT.
Regarding RQ4, we take as reference the definition of in-
tegrity from the ISO 25010 [24], and we intend to characterize
the attacks to which the blockchain is vulnerable and which
could mine its integrity.
RQ5 concerns the need to further protect users’ privacy,
by avoiding that IoT devices can be linked to their owner.
Anonymity in blockchain systems is intended as pseudonymity
plus unlinkability, where the latter is the impossibility to link
an address of the blockchain system with a real identity or
an IP address, and also the impossibility to understand that
different addresses of the system belong to the same user. We
answer to this question by describing the techniques found in
the literature which undermines anonymity.
Finally, RQ6 aims at verifying whether the blockchain is
adaptable to the number of transactions. This is fundamental
if we want to employ the blockchain in the IoT, where the
number of transactions produced by IoT devices could be very
large. Also for this question we employ the generic definition
of adaptability from [24], and we narrow it by intending the
adaptability of the blockchain as its ability to scale with the
number of transactions.
C. Search process
To conduct the study, we followed the guidelines on SLR
provided by Kitchenham [25]. We used the string blockchain
to search in the following digital libraries: IEEE Xplore; ACM
Digital Library; SpringerLink; ScienceDirect; Google Scholar.
We gathered 1511 papers. In order to decide which of them
deeply analyze, we performed two exclusion stages - one based
on titles and the other on abstracts - and we excluded papers
regarding non-engineering aspects (e.g., papers addressing
ethical issues of the blockchain or purely economic aspects of
cryptocurrencies). Finally, we left 35 papers, from which we
extracted the information necessary to answer our questions.
III. RESULTS
In this section we report the results extracted from the
analyzed papers, organized by research question. Discussion
on the results will follow in Section IV.
RQ1 and RQ2: Use cases and IoT. The results answering
RQ1 and RQ2 are shown in Table I. Specifically, for each
paper we report: the category1 in which we classified the paper,
the reference to the paper in the bibliography, the usage of the
blockchain, and whether the authors of that paper believe that
it can be applied in the IoT.
RQ3: Implementation differences with Bitcoin. We report
the answer to RQ3 in two tables: Table II refers to RQ3.1,
while Table III to RQ3.2.
RQ4: Integrity. We report the attacks found in the papers
analyzed to which the blockchain is vulnerable.
In [28], it is shown that most of the peers known by a peer
of the Bitcoin network reside in its same autonomous system.
This means that the P2P network is not well connected and
there could be difficulties in the relay of new blocks added
to the blockchain. This makes the achievement of distributed
consensus hard.
The authors of [29] shows that an attacker which controls
a large number of nodes, even if with not high computational
capabilities, could achieve an high fraction of the total com-
putational power in small blockchain systems where there are
few miners. This could threaten the integrity of the system,
because the attacker would be able to cause intentional forks.
In [30], it is introduced the selfish mining attack. In this
attack, a malicious mining pool decides not to publish the
blocks it finds, thus creating a fork in the blockchain, where
1The following categories have been defined: data storage management,
trades of goods and data, identity management, rating system, other
TABLE II: Data Inserted into the Blockchain (RQ3.1)
Paper Data in the blockchain
[5] Access policy and reference to data
[12] Key to access sensors data and multisigned transactions to exchange
bitcoins with commodities
[14] Revocation or verification address of PGP certificates
[15] Triples (ID, PK, action), where action refers to registration, update or
verification of the public key PK
[11] Messages metadata of the decentralized application
[19] Specifications useful for license validation
[13] Data purchased from sensors
[17] Reference to published content
[18] Rating information
[20] Hash of contents to be timestamped
[6] Spend conditions, file contract, storage proofs and arbitrary data
[7] Payment contracts
[21] A lottery contract
[16] Information for registration, revocation and update of public keys
[8] Access policy, reference to data and other information to recover data
[9] Reference to data and other metadata
[10] Transactions to safely deposit bitcoins
TABLE III: Mining Techniques (RQ3.2)
Paper Mining technique
[5] New measure of trust to give more weight to trusted nodes in mining
[26] The miner producing the minimum block hash is selected for mining
[23] Proof of Stake Velocity
[27] Proof of Space
there are the public branch of the honest miners and the private
branch of the malicious pool. It keeps mining on its private
branch until the public one approaches the private one in
length. At this point, it publishes its own private branch, which
could become the longest one and could be accepted also by
honest miners. So, after some time, the public branch and
the data contained in it would be discarded. Denoting with γ
the ratio of honest miners which mine on the malicious pool
branch when made public, the authors show that according to
the values of γ the malicious pool could get more advantages
with the selfish mining strategy than with honest mining.
Another attack, called history-revision attack, is pointed out
in [31]. The authors state that, in the case an attacker owns a
computational power multiple of the computational power of
honest nodes (e.g., two times higher), it is able to produce a
branch of the blockchain which could overtake the current one
in terms of difficulty of the PoW, and so could be accepted
by other miners, thus changing the history of the blockchain.
In [32], the authors show that an attacker could delay
delivery of blocks or transactions to other nodes in the Bitcoin
P2P network. This could bring to: more advantages in selfish
mining, if the attacker is able to avoid delivering of blocks
from honest miners to a portion of the network; denial of
service, because, if the attacker controls several nodes, it can
prevent dissemination of information.
In [33], an expansion of selfish mining called stubborn
mining is described. Results show that in some situations it
could be more advantageous than selfish mining.
TABLE IV: De-Anonymization Techniques (RQ5)
De-anonymization technique Papers
Multiple inputs [34], [35], [36]
Change address [34], [35], [36]
Associations with IP [28], [37]
Usage of centralized services [36], [38]
RQ5: Anonymity. In Table IV we classified the papers
according to the de-anonymization techniques they mention.
We identified four categories of de-anonymization techniques:
multiple inputs, change address, associations with IP and usage
of centralized services.
When an user issues a transaction with multiple addresses
as inputs, she reveals to own all those addresses. For this
reason, in [34]–[36] the authors can safely state that all the
input addresses of the same transaction belong to the user that
issued that multiple-inputs transaction.
In systems like Bitcoin, in some transactions users send
coins to a particular address that belongs to themselves, called
change address. In [34]–[36], the authors are able to link this
change address to other addresses of the same user.
In [28] and [37], starting from some hypotheses and analyz-
ing network traffic, the authors are able to associate Bitcoin
addresses with IP addresses.
In [36] [38], usage of centralized services that keep track
of associations between more addresses of the same user or
real identity of the user and her address is considered a risk
for the anonymity of the user.
RQ6: Adaptability. We found only three papers reporting
information on adaptability, with a coarse detail level. In [13],
where the blockchain is used to purchase sensors data via
bitcoins, the authors state there are scalability issues due
to the exploding number of transactions and sensors data
permanently stored on every Bitcoin node. In [8], according
to the authors the blockchain cannot scale to deal with many
complex transactions. For this reason, they propose that com-
putations and data storage should not be done by each node
of the network, instead by a small subset of them working
on different parts of data. The authors of [31] point out that
scalability is a problem because every node of the blockchain
should verify each block and transaction issued.
IV. DISCUSSION
Use cases and IoT. As one may notice in Table I, cryp-
tocurrencies like Bitcoin are just one of the possible use cases
of the blockchain. In some cases, the blockchain is employed
for decentralizing services that so far have been provided
by centralized trusted entities (e.g., PKI or timestamping).
Moreover, we observed that only 4 of the 18 found use
cases are considered applicable to the context of the Internet
of Things. Two of them, [12], [13], use the blockchain for
trading data collected by sensors of IoT devices and other
goods. In the third [15] the IoT is mentioned as a possible
field in which each device is identified by a public key to
interact with other devices through the blockchain. Finally,
the mechanism described in the fourth [8] can be employed
to store and manage data collected by IoT devices, in a
decentralized and private-by-design fashion. This last use case
and all the others classified as “Data storage management”
(even if not explicitly thought for the IoT) are in line with
the goal of our research: encouraging a private-by-design IoT
where devices data are not entrusted to centralized companies.
Just to mention some use cases of this category, [9] and [6] are
both decentralized storage platforms, where the blockchain is
employed for implementing storage audits, useful for detecting
any non-authorized deletion or modification of data. These
audits are performed by storing the hash of the data in the
blockchain. Then the data owner periodically sends a challenge
to the host of the data and checks the correctness of the
response using the hash in the blockchain. Any non-authorized
deletion or modification of the data entails a wrong response,
so any abuse can be detected. In [5] the blockchain enforces
access policies that define which data of a user share and with
whom. It leverages public key cryptography: each entity is
represented by a public key and the policy specifies restricted
accesses for the public keys of the interested entities. Only the
data owner has full access to her data. Policies are stored in
the blockchain and the nodes of the blockchain verify whether
they are respected. From observing such applications of the
blockchain in the literature, we can conclude that:
It has been documented that the blockchain can be used for
detecting abuses on data and defining access policies, without
the need of entrusting people’s data to centralized companies.
Implementation differences. Regarding RQ3.1, we ob-
served that in some papers data are inserted in the Bitcoin
blockchain, employing the 80 bytes of Bitcoin transactions
reserved for arbitrary data; in other papers, a customized
blockchain is used to store the data. Regarding RQ3.2, the min-
ing techniques reported are all less computationally-expensive
alternatives to PoW: in [5] the PoW is facilitated to trusted
nodes; in [26] the selection of the miner which adds the
new block depends on luck and not on the computations
performed by the miner; in [23] no computations are required,
the miner is chosen according to the age of coin she owns;
in [27] the miner is chosen according to her amount of space,
and not her computational capabilities. In the IoT scenario,
it could be useful to take into consideration one of the
less computationally-expensive alternatives to PoW showed
in Table III. In fact, PoW requires very high computational
power, and so IoT devices with limited capabilities would
not be able to add blocks in the blockchain. However, before
designing a blockchain with an alternative mining technique
which allows all IoT devices to fairly participate in the system,
we should further analyze what are the security properties
provided by the PoW, which up to now is one of the key factors
allowing to achieve distributed consensus. We refer to the
following discussion on integrity for more on that. Therefore,
from our analysis we conclude that:
Arbitrary data can be inserted in the blockchain, so in
theory any applications (not only cryptocurrencies) can be
developed on top of it. Some less expensive alternatives to
PoW are documented in the literature.
Integrity. Several countermeasures have been proposed for
some of the attacks described in Section III. For example, for
selfish mining attacks, [30] and [39] propose modifications
in the way miners decide which block to extend, in order to
decrease γ, i.e. the portion of honest miners which extend the
blockchain proposed by selfish miners.
However, what we evince from the results is that the greatest
risk for the blockchain integrity is represented by the presence
of misbehaving miners which own an high proportion of the
computational power of the system. They could cause forks
to the blockchain, bringing to a situation where distributed
consensus is difficult to achieve and some past data could be
lost. In addition, they could pollute the blockchain with invalid
data or transactions. Such risk is avoided in already large and
stable blockchains like the Bitcoin one, because obtaining an
high proportion of the computational power is hard thanks to
the difficulty of the PoW and to the great number of miners,
which in addition are incentivized to act honestly. For this
reason, starting a completely new blockchain, which does not
have a critical mass in the initial phase, is risky. Even if
understanding in depth the security of the Bitcoin blockchain
is not trivial, because it depends also on socioeconomics factor,
in this moment Bitcoin is the most stable and secure block-
chain system. So, instead of designing a new blockchain from
scratch, our suggestion is to develop distributed applications
for the IoT on top of the Bitcoin or another secure and
stable blockchain. This can be done by leveraging a layered
architecture, like the one proposed in Blockstack [40]. In this
solution, the additional functionalities of the application are
defined in another layer on top of the blockchain. Moreover,
the blockchain is hidden at the application level, so low-
performance IoT devices are not required to compute the PoW.
To conclude:
We believe that the most secure approach is to develop IoT
applications on top of an already existing stable blockchain,
where PoW and the great number of honest miners ensure
integrity, and avoid that misbehaving miners can obtain a
large portion of computational power.
Anonymity. From the results documented in papers of
Table IV, it is possible to de-anonymize a user by analyzing
network traffic or the blockchain itself, since it is public. So,
pseudonymity is not enough to guarantee total anonymity.
Countermeasures are proposed in [15], [31], [38], [41], [42]. In
[38], [41], [42], mixing protocols are analyzed. The main idea
behind mixing protocols is that a user sends some coins from
an address and receives them back to another address in a way
that it is difficult to discover the correspondence between input
and output addresses of the same user. Also the fair exchange
protocol described in [31] is based on the same principle of
mixing protocols and allows two parties to securely exchange
money. In the work regarding the blockchain used as PKI [15],
the authors describe a method for the user to update her public
key without linking it to her ID in the system. To conclude:
Pseudonimity is not enough to achieve total anonymity.
Solutions that reduce the possibility of linking IoT devices to
their owner should still be analyzed in future work.
Adaptability. As documented in Section III, the scalability
issue of the blockchain is reported in three papers. Actually,
there are two main scalability issues. The first is that, when
the number of transactions grows, the blockchain increases in
size, and it becomes expensive to store it, especially for IoT
devices with limited resources. This issue can be addressed
by the layered architecture described also for the integrity.
In this architecture, where the blockchain is separated from
the application layer, IoT devices with limited resources store
only the portion of the blockchain they need for their own
transactions (the so-called thin clients, already present also in
Bitcoin).
The second issue is the low throughput of transactions -
a typical issue of the Bitcoin blockchain, which we did not
find in the papers but is largely discussed within the Bitcoin
community. The low throughput is due to the difficulty of
the PoW and to the maximum size of a block, which is set
to 1 MB. This issue represents a tradeoff between scalability
and security. In fact, regarding the PoW, if its difficulty is
reduced, the throughput will be higher, but at the same time it
will be easier for an attacker to cause forks in the blockchain.
Regarding the block size, if its maximum is increased, the
throughput will increase too, but it will be more difficult to
validate transactions: this implies that only few nodes will be
able to do it, and so the power of Bitcoin will be concentrated
in few hands. Again, a solution could be a layered architecture,
where not all operations performed at the application layer
require a transaction in the underlying blockchain. However,
this may not be enough for the IoT, where the blockchain
should support billion of devices. For this reason, we retain
that, even if in this moment the Bitcoin blockchain is the most
secure, it could be prohibitive to leverage it in the IoT because
of its scalability issues. Instead, it could be more convenient to
employ another stable and secure blockchain which provides
higher level of scalability with respect to Bitcoin. To conclude:
The scalability issues of the Bitcoin blockchain make it
poorly suitable for the IoT, so we suggest to develop IoT
applications on top of another secure but scalable blockchain.
In future work, we will test different blockchains to find a
suitable one, in which the trade-off between scalability and
security is acceptable. Moreover, we suggest to adopt a layered
architecture which supports thin clients to allow IoT devices
with limited resources to store only a portion of the blockchain.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We conducted a Systematic Literature Review to investigate
which are the uses cases of the blockchain in the literature
and which factors affect integrity, anonymity and adaptability
of this technology. The ultimate goal of our research is to
leverage the blockchain and P2P approaches for a private-by-
design IoT where data produced by devices are not entrusted
to centralized companies.
We reported several uses of the blockchain. Even if few
of them are explicitly thought for the IoT, we found several
use cases for a private and decentralized data management,
which are in line with the goal of our research. Regarding the
integrity and the adaptability, we found that large blockchain
systems like Bitcoin are the most secure, but at the same time
Bitcoin scalability issues make it little suitable for the IoT.
Regarding the anonymity, we found that in the blockchain
only pseudonymity is guaranteed.
To address the integrity and the adaptability issues, our
future work will consist in testing existing secure and scalable
blockchains and in designing a layered architecture for IoT
applications on top of the most suitable of them. Moreover,
we will investigate mixing protocols and other solutions to
achieve anonymity and further protect people’s privacy.
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